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We consider resource allocation within an organisation when agents have a preference for
autonomy and show how delegation bears on moral hazard and adverse selection. Agents may
care about autonomy for reasons of job-satisfaction, status or greater reputation of perform-
ance under autonomy. Separating allocations (overall budget and degree of delegation) are
characterised depending on the preference for autonomy. As the latter is increasing, the de-
gree of delegation assigned to productive and unproductive agents becomes more similar and
may even be reversed when financial transfers are used. If agents’ preference for monetary
rewards is sufficiently weak, the principal will not employ financial transfers and pooling
arises if the preference for autonomy is strong.
Keywords: adverse selection, capital budgeting, delegation, moral hazard, non-
responsiveness, resource allocation.
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1 Introduction
When devising resource (or budget) allocations, principals regularly face a trade-off between
delegating to an agent tasks, for which he has a comparative advantage, and retaining suffi-
cient control of the agent’s actions. This control is warranted to contain the potential problems
of adverse selection – the agent over-stating the value of the project or his own productivity in
order to attract additional budget – and moral hazard – the agent providing insufficient effort
in using the budget, leading to under-achievement. In a perfect world, the principal could ad-
dress these agency problems either by retaining full control or by delegating as fully as possi-
ble, but at the same time exposing the agent to the strongest possible incentives, in the ex-
treme by selling the firm. In reality, the presence of monitoring costs on the one hand and
wealth constraints or risk aversion on the other render these solutions impractical. Usually the
principal will have to strike a balance between delegating and retaining control. Harris and
Raviv (1998) explain delegation of budgeting decisions as a response to costly auditing. The
cost of communication, the incompleteness of agency contracts and the ‘value of flexibility’
also tend to favour delegation (Melumad et al. 1997). Holmstrom and Roberts (1994) demon-
strate that delegation - in the sense of transferring assets to the agent and/or of relaxing con-
trols on the returns of assets accruing to the agent - paired with strong outcome related incen-
tives, is an optimal response to a lower cost of outcome measurement or a lower risk. In con-
trast, more control is favoured if spill-overs between agents require central co-ordination or if
agents hold lower bargaining power than the principal vis-à-vis third parties (Caillaud et al.
1996).
One common aspect of these models is that agents are concerned about the degree of control
only to the extent to which it limits their scope to manipulate information or engage in slack-
ing. In this regard, the models are firmly rooted in the neo-classical paradigm in which agents
are motivated by extrinsic incentives, i.e. by performance-related rewards or punishments. A
more recent line of literature acknowledges that agents may be motivated by non-financial-
aspects of their jobs. Frey (1993, 1997) argues that agents may be driven by intrinsic motiva-
tion. This means that agents derive satisfaction from performing a task well and provide effort
even in the absence of extrinsic incentives.
1 However, intrinsic motivation is not independent
of the working environment. Specifically, it may be crowded out by extrinsic incentives such
as performance standards and the associated punishments or rewards.
2 The latter tend to de-
stroy the agents’ self-evaluation of doing ‘something decent’ over and above what is expected
or even enforced anyway. The control associated with extrinsic rewards also leads to a loss of
self-determinedness that further undermines motivation.
3 The possible crowding-out of intrin-
sic motivation constrains the principal’s scope in providing external performance incentives.
4
                                                                
1 Other non-financial motivations include altruism, as often assumed in the modelling of physician behaviour
(e.g. McGuire 2001: section 6.2), and status (e.g. Encinosa et al. 1997).
2 Hence, agents not only care about outcomes but also about the process at which these outcomes are arrived at
(Sen 1997). Frey and Benz (2002) argue that procedural utility derived from the mode of production (self-
employed or not) matters and provide evidence supporting the view that job satisfaction decreases in the degree
of control.
3 Bénabou and Tirole (2003) formalise this crowding out under the assumption that the imposition of external
rewards signals a low ability / high effort cost to the agent who is incompletely informed on this.
4 Barkema (1995) provides evidence for this by showing that the effect of external intervention on work per-
formance in Dutch firms is significantly positive (negative) in the case of impersonal (personal) control. Since
intrinsic motivation tends to be more sensitive in personal relationships, the evidence lends some support to the
crowding out hypothesis. Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) provide evidence that managerial incentives are sig-
nificantly weaker in non-profit as opposed to for-profit hospitals. This may be due to a number of explanations.
First, it may reflect the consumption of rents as slack within non-profit organisations. Second, it may reflect that2
Even in the absence of intrinsic motivation, agents may have a preference for autonomy. This
is the case if the agent’s performance and the degree of control are – at least to some extent –
observable. In this case, a good performance under a greater degree of autonomy is clearly a
better signal of an agent’s ability than the same performance achieved under tight supervi-
sion.
5 Thus, the reputation and, with it, the prospective earnings of an agent tend to increase in
the degree of autonomy.
When applying these ideas to the issue of budgetary delegation, one should expect the optimal
mix of delegation and control to be determined not only by technological and informational
considerations but also by its impact on the agents’ motivation. Ignoring the latter could lead
to distortions in the agents’ effort, outweighing the benefits from greater control. More posi-
tively, the principal can use autonomy as an incentive device. It is the aim of the present
analysis to address the implications for the allocation of budgets of agents’ preferences for
autonomy under moral hazard and adverse selection. We consider a model in which a princi-
pal allocates to an agent a budget for the purpose of production and determines the agent’s
autonomy in the use of it. She may also use a financial transfer to motivate the agent, where
we distinguish the scenarios in which output is contractible and in which it is not. Agents dif-
fer in their efficiency in using a delegated budget either because they differ in ability or they
face projects of different degrees of profitability. Here, we assume that an agent’s type may be
unknown to the principal. The agent’s preferences over autonomy determine his effort incen-
tives but also his preferences over different budgetary allocations. Thus, the level of auton-
omy granted to an agent is determined technologically by the agent’s efficiency in handling
the budget, motivationally by the agent’s propensity to provide effort in return to autonomy,
and by the agent’s self-selection incentives in the presence of asymmetric information.
If agents value autonomy (control), the principal over- (under-)delegates (relative to the tech-
nological optimum excluding motivation) as a stimulus for the provision of effort. Under full
information an efficient type receives both the greater budget and the greater degree of auton-
omy. Under asymmetric information, the principal distorts the overall budgets and the degree
of delegation from their efficient levels in order to guarantee self-selection. In this, the agent’s
preference for autonomy turns out to play an important role. Unexpected allocations arise in
the presence of a strong preference for autonomy. If the preference for autonomy is suffi-
ciently strong but not too strong, the inefficient agent receives the greater budget and the de-
gree of delegation is distorted downwards for the efficient agent and upwards for the ineffi-
cient agent. If the preference for autonomy is very strong the budget allocation depends on
whether the principal employs a financial transfer as an additional instrument to generate self-
selection. If this is the case, the efficient agent receives the greater budget but, perversely, a
lower degree of delegation. The principal abstains from the use of financial incentives if the
agent values the non-monetary benefit (job satisfaction) sufficiently more than the monetary
benefit. In this case, the budgets are pooled if the preference for autonomy is strong. While we
derive these results for a setting in which output is non-contractible, we demonstrate that they
carry over to a setting in which output is contractible. Overall, our findings illustrate the po-
tentially important role of the agents’ preferences for autonomy, or preferences over the mode
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
non-profit hospitals perform additional tasks related to equity objectives or the provision of public goods. In as
far as these tasks are difficult to monitor, the multi-task nature of the problem may require that weak incentives
are implemented on all tasks. Finally, the absence of strong incentive systems is consistent with the presence of
intrinsically motivated staff. This is particularly likely if self-selection occurs of intrinsically motivated manag-
ers into non-profit organisations.
5 There is an extensive literature on the incentive effects of career concerns (e.g., Holmstrom 1999, Dewatripont
et al. 1999), but to my knowledge it does not address the signal’s dependence on the degree of autonomy.3
of production more generally, for the purpose of intra-organisational resource allocation. This
role becomes particularly pertinent under circumstances of asymmetric information and when
the agent’s preferences differ greatly from the principal’s.
A recent literature deals with the effects on agency relationships of intrinsic motivation or,
similarly, a public service spirit. Francois (2000) compares the incentives within public or
non-profit as opposed to private providers when agents care in an altruistic way about the
service provided.
6 Delfgaauw and Dur (2002) derive optimal incentive contracts for intrinsi-
cally motivated workers and consider the selection of workers into the firm when motivation
is unobservable but may be signalled on the part of agents.
7 While asymmetric information
about agent type pertains in our model as well, we consider screening rather than signalling.
Glazer (2004) analyses how the principal chooses an input jointly with an intrinsically moti-
vated agent’s choice of effort, where inputs can be complements or substitutes and where
moves can be simultaneous or sequential. In these models agents care about output but in
contrast to our model their motivation does not depend on the mode of production.
Besley and Ghatak (2003) also model public service motivation but take into account that the
organisation’s mission influences incentives, where a mission is defined as the attributes of a
project that make people value its success over and above any monetary rewards. Their analy-
sis focuses on principal-agent matching rather than on optimal incentive schemes. Aghion and
Tirole (1997) show that it pays principals to grant ‘real’ authority, even at the expense of
control, if this induces agents to exert additional effort and relaxes their participation con-
straint.
8 Their analysis then focuses on how organisational overload or institutional arrange-
ments commit principals to transfer real authority to agents even if they always retain formal
authority. Murdock (2002) analyses how agents can be motivated by allowing them to estab-
lish a loss-making project with high intrinsic value to them in exchange for their effort to-
wards a profit-making project. Due to the principal’s lack of commitment these contracts will
usually have to be relational rather than explicit. While these models share with ours the idea
that the principal can enhance (intrinsic) motivation by giving up some control to the agent,
they focus on the moral hazard problem alone and do not consider an adverse selection di-
mension that is central to our analysis.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003: section 3.1) consider the scope for crowding in intrinsic motiva-
tion by way of granting autonomy to an agent. They assume that, in contrast to the principal,
the agent is only imperfectly informed about his type (high or low ability). By granting auton-
omy the principal not only provides a benefit to agents of all types, but she also signals that
the agent’s ability is high. By raising the agent’s confidence this raises further the willingness
to provide effort. Similar to our model, asymmetric information about the agent’s type bears
on the degree of delegation. However, the nature of this is rather different, as Bénabou and
Tirole assume the principal rather than the agent to be the informed party. Finally, the context
of all the aforementioned models is different in that they consider the expanse of effort on the
development of profitable or otherwise projects, whereas we focus on the delegation of budg-
ets.
                                                                
6 See also Dixit (2002). Heckman et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence supporting the presence of a public
service spirit. They find that US social workers systematically select the least employable cases into job training
programme in spite of performance incentives encouraging cream-skimming in favour of the most employable.
7 Within different set-ups, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and Grepperud and Pedersen (2004) derive optimal per-
formance pay when intrinsic motivation may be crowded out.
8 A similar spirit underlies the models by Gertner et al. (1994) and Mitusch (2000), where the agent’s effort de-
creases in the degree of control as this delimits a real resource (rather than an intrinsic) rent.4
In this latter aspect, our model is related to the principal-agent literature as applied to budget-
ing problems and is closest in spirit to Harris and Raviv (1998) and Bernardo et al. (2001).
9
Harris and Raviv (1998) consider an adverse selection setting without moral hazard in which
the principal can use a costly audit as an instrument besides the budget assignments. They
show that the optimal capital allocation generally implies over- (under-) investment for proj-
ects with low (high) productivity. The extent of this distortion increases in the audit cost. Har-
ris and Raviv explain the scope for delegation – in the sense of the manager having a choice
on capital allocation between two projects, which cannot be predicted by the principal – as an
increasing function of the auditing cost. The focus of our analysis lies not so much with an
explanation of delegation, the necessity of which we take as granted, but rather with the in-
centive role of delegation with regard to moral hazard and adverse selection. Similar to us,
Bernardo et al. (2001) consider both moral hazard and adverse selection, where in both cases
agents have an incentive to over-report profitability or level of ability in order to attract high
budgets. As agents are not directly concerned about output in Bernardo et al., they can only be
motivated by performance pay. While we also consider the scope for performance pay, one
key instrument to stimulate effort is the budget allocation, as modified by the degree of
autonomy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
derives the full information optimum and discusses the role of delegation in resolving moral
hazard when output is non-contractible. In section 4, we analyse in detail the allocation under
asymmetric information maintaining the assumption of non-contractible output. Sections 5
and 6 deal with the case of contractible output in the absence and presence of asymmetric
information, respectively. Section 7 provides a brief analysis of the case in which agents dif-
fer in their preference for autonomy and section 8 concludes. The proofs are relegated to an
appendix.
2 The model
An agent produces an output or service, the value of which is given by a homogeneous func-
tion  ( ) ( ) r b r b , , , , , , , r b eh r b e H = , where  e is a non-contractible effort,  b is the delegated
budget and  r  is the budget, which is retained under central control. The productivity of the
budgetary inputs  b and  r  is measured by  b and  r, respectively. In order to simplify the
analysis, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification
( )
r b r b r b r b h = , , , , ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ b ; ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ r ( ) 1 2 < + r bE ;
10
Thus, each budget exhibits non-negative but decreasing returns. A few words are warranted as
to our interpretation of the delegated and retained budgets. Suppose the principal assigns an
overall budget  r b B + =  to the agent. The delegated budget  b is the part of the overall allo-
cation over the use of which the agent can dispose freely in the course of production. The re-
tained budget r  remains under the principal’s control. It could either be spent by the principal
on the purchase of inputs, which are then transferred to the agent for further use. Alterna-
tively, the agent may have to obtain the principal’s approval on the use of  r , or only use this
budget according to strict guidelines.
                                                                
9 For a more detailed review of this literature see Harris and Raviv (1998).
10 The last constraint on the parameters guarantees concavity of the objective function.5
Let us now introduce the concept of delegation and autonomy we have in mind. Define
r
b D = : ,  [ ) ¥ ˛ , 0 D  as the ‘degree of delegation’. It appeals to us to use the degree of delega-
tion as a proxy measure of autonomy, understood as the absence of central intervention.
11
Using  r
b D =  together with  r b B + =  to rewrite  D
B r + = 1  and  D
DB b + = 1 , we obtain the relation-
ship  ( ) ( )
r b b +
+ = ￿ D
B D B D h 1 , ,  describing production as a function of the degree of delegation
and the overall budget. Subsequently, we will make use of both specifications,  ( ) ￿ , ,r b h  and
( ) ￿ , ,B D h  according to analytical and presentational convenience.
In using the function  ( ) r b, , ,r b h , the model remains general about the particular use in pro-
duction of the budgetary inputs b and r . Likewise, we side-step the issue as to which activi-
ties should be delegated in order to focus on the incentive role of delegation. In this regard,
the function  ( ) ￿ h  is a ‘black-box’, which merely reflects that production can be organised in a
variety of ways, involving a greater or lesser extent of delegation. The production elasticity  b
captures the efficiency of delegation. It can be understood to reflect the agent’s technology
and information as well as the transaction costs involved in delegation.
 For example,  b may
be low if the agent uses an inferior technology, if he has poorer access to information lower
capacity of processing it, or if he has little bargaining power vis-à-vis local suppliers. Fur-
thermore,  b may reflect an agent’s propensity to shirk. Alternatively,  b may characterise the
specific project to be carried out by the agent, where projects with a high  b allow greater
gains to delegation perhaps because they are of a non-standard nature so that there is little
experience at the centre. The elasticity  r captures the effectiveness of controlling budgets. It
is determined by the cost of communicating relevant information to the centre as well as by
the cost of communicating to the agents the centrally determined action plan. Furthermore,  r
depends on the cost of monitoring and enforcing the agents’ compliance with the principal’s
plan.
12 It is readily verified that production  ( ) ￿ h  is concave in  D, implying the existence of a
maximum at  r
b = D
~
. Indeed, if agents are unconcerned about autonomy,  D ~ is the optimal
degree of delegation. In the following, we will occasionally refer to it as the technologically
efficient degree of delegation.
Each agent receives utility  at U V + = , where U  is the agent’s non-monetary benefit of pro-
duction and at  is the value the agent places on a monetary transfer received from the princi-
pal, e.g. a salary. The agent’s non-monetary benefit of production is given by
( ) ( ) r
b e D r b e H D u U = - = : ; , , , 2
2
r b (1)
It increases in output  () ￿ H and decreases in the quadratic cost of effort. The extent to which an
agent benefits from his production is governed by the weight  ( ) D u , embracing the agent’s
preferences over autonomy and control. Specifically, let
                                                                
11 We define the degree of delegation as a factor-intensity for analytical convenience. A more intuitive measure
of the degree of delegation would be the share of the delegated budget in the total budget  r b
b
+ . It is easy to verify
that for any two pairs ( ) r b,  and ( ) ' , ' r b  it is true that  ' '
'
' '







b = > = ￿ > + + . Thus, a greater degree of
delegation implies and is implied by a greater share of the delegated budget in the total budget.
12 In this regard, we distinguish the actions that can be controlled for by the principal from those for which the
unverifiable effort e  is relevant. The former could relate to spending decisions, whereas the latter would relate
to the effort taken by the agent in drawing up the project and generating options that enhance its value.6
( )
a kD D u = , [ ] r b a , - ˛ , 0 > k ,
where the parameter  a reflects the agent’s preference for autonomy. A greater degree of
delegation, i.e. greater autonomy, raises the utility weight if and only if  0 > a . The agent’s
concern about production could be explained by any of the following reasons. First, intrinsi-
cally motivated agents care about  () ￿ H , with the motivation increasing in the degree of auton-
omy. Second, agents may derive a ‘warm glow’ benefit à la Andreoni (1990) from providing
to their customers a service  () ￿ H , a benefit they derive only to the extent of their ‘personal’
contribution towards it. Third, agents may be driven by professional status. As status usually
rises with the degree of responsibility, it is plausible to assume that the agent’s benefit from
status increases not only with output but also with the extent to which this has been produced
autonomously. Finally,  () ( ) ￿ ￿ H u  may be a measure of the agent’s (discounted) future earnings,
as determined by the reputation from having carried out the present task. It is reasonable to
assume that the value of the reputation increases not only in the outcome but also in the de-
gree of autonomy, as this measures the agent’s individual as opposed to the organisation’s
contribution towards production. Note that in some instances agents may have a preference
for central intervention such that  0 < a . This may be due to a dislike for responsibility, when
the agent suffers discomfort from a moral pressure to get the job right.
In the following, we assume that there are two types of agents/projects, efficient (E) and inef-
ficient (I), where efficient agents/projects are characterised by  I E b b > . Let  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ l  denote
the probability of an agent/project being an E type, or alternatively the share of E types in the
population. The principal levies budgets at a cost y , which we normalise to  1 = y  without
loss of generality. The (risk-neutral) principal’s expected net value of production can then be
written as
( ) ( ) [ ]






- - - - +
- - -
=
I I I I I I I
E E E E E E E
I I I E E E t r b r b e H
t r b r b e H
t r b t r b R
b l
b l
, , , 1
, , ,
, , , , , (2).
Sequence of moves




{ } I E i t r b i i i , , , =
A decides on whether to
participate and if yes self-
selects contract.
P assigns budgets { } i i i t r b , ,
A chooses effort  i e.
A privately observes
type  { } I E b b b , ˛
Output  i H  is realised and
transfer    i t    takes place
Figure 1: Timing of contract.7
The agent privately observes his type  { } E I b b b , ˛ . Then, the principal offers a contract
{ } i i i t r b , , , which the agent accepts or rejects. Upon acceptance the agent self-selects. The
contract is then executed with the principal providing the budgets and the agent choosing ef-
fort. Finally, output is realised and transfers take place. We will consider two scenarios.
Scenario 1 (sections 3 and 4). Neither effort e nor output  H  is contractible. Here, we have in
mind a situation in which the agent does not produce a marketable output himself but rather
an intermediate input into a more general production function. This embraces activities such
as R&D, advertising or strategic planning, the contributions of which towards a company’s
profit are difficult to verify. Output verification is also difficult in case of a bureaucrat pro-
ducing a non-market good or service. In this case, the transfer  i t  from the principal to the
agent cannot be made contingent on output but only on the budgetary allocation  { } i i r b , . Note
that the aforementioned activities often feature a strong role for motivation and autonomy.
Scenario 2 (sections 5 and 6). Here, effort continues to be non-contractible but output is now
verifiable so that contracts can be written in which transfers depend on the realised output.
This situation sometimes reflects the provision of expert services by members of the medical,
educational and legal professions but also of more conventional management activities.
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Wealth and participation constraints
We assume that the agent faces a wealth constraint  0 t t ‡ , where we normalise  0 0 = t  without
loss of generality. More importantly, we assume that the agent’s outside benefit  0 V  is such
that participation at  0 ‡ t  is always guaranteed. For the sake of simplicity, assume  0 0 = V . In
this case, the requirement of non-negative transfers and the non-verifiability of effort imply
that the agent’s ex-post utility satisfies  0 ‡ ‡ + = U at U V , where the second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that the agent could always choose  0 = e . Hence, participation is guaran-
teed irrespective of the agent’s type. Generally, the interaction of the wealth and participation
constraints defines a range of different regimes similar to those featured in Laffont and Mar-
timort (2002: section 3.5). With the main interest of the paper lying on the regime with a slack
participation constraint, we will presently focus on this case without providing a complete
characterisation. At this stage, merely note that a slack participation constraint is not unlikely
in situations in which the agent’s non-monetary benefit is substantial such as in the profes-
sional and/or ‘creative’ services we have in mind. In particular, if these services are built on
longer-term relationships or involve specific investments, the agent’s non-monetary benefit
may lie well above his outside utility so that rent equalisation would require a payment from
the agent to the principal. We assume that such payments are ruled out by wealth constraints,
or in other words, that the agent’s non-monetary rents cannot be (fully) extracted.
3 Allocation under full information when output is not contractible: Motivation
by delegation
When neither effort nor output are contractible (scenario 1) the principal cannot use the trans-
fers to stimulate effort on the part of the agent. In this case, it is optimal to set  0 = = I E t t ,
                                                                
13 Note that in many cases, outcome related pay is not instituted even within the professions. This is the case
where outcomes are hard to verify (health as the outcome of medical services) and/or where the professional
works as part of a team (education).8
where the wealth constraint binds. Under complete information, the principal can identify the
type of individual agents/projects and accurately allocates type specific budgets so as to
0
, , , max = = I E
I I E E
t t
r b r b R  as given in (2). In so doing, she will take into account the effect of delegation
on the agent’s motivation and provision of effort. Solving the problem backwards, we begin
by considering the agent’s choice of effort. Given the budget, the agent chooses effort so as to
maximise utility (1). From the first-order condition
( ) ( ) ( )
a r a b b b
- + = = = r kb r b h D u r b e e , , , , ˆ
* (3),
we obtain output and utility as functions of the budgets only
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
a r a b b b b b
- + = = =
2 2 2 , , , , , , ˆ , , ˆ r kb r b h D u r b h r b e r b H (4),
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) a r a b b b b b b







1 , , , , ˆ , , , , ˆ , , ˆ r b k r b h D u r b e r b h D u r b e r b U (5).
Placing the restrictions  1 ‡ b  and  1 ‡ r , we obtain  ( ) 0 , , ˆ > b b r b H  and  ( ) 0 , , ˆ > b b r b U  as well
as  ( ) 0 , , ˆ > b b r b H x  and  ( ) 0 , , ˆ > b b r b U x ,  r b x , = . Hence, total and marginal output as well as
total and marginal utility are greater for the E type, reflecting the greater productivity. Again,
we will sometimes express effort, output and utility as functions  ( ) b , , ˆ D B e ,  ( ) b , , ˆ D B H  and
( ) b , , ˆ D B U . One can then easily check that equilibrium effort and utility are concave in  D,
with  ( ) [ ] D D
U
D
e a r b a - - + = = ¶
¶
¶
¶ sgn sgn sgn
ˆ ˆ . The principal can then stimulate extra effort by
increasing the degree of delegation up to the level
( ) I E i D B U D i i i
i







that maximises the agent’s utility. The concavity of  ( ) b , , ˆ D B e  in  D reflects the conventional
wisdom that granting some responsibility tends to make people work harder, while too much
delegation encourages slack.
Consider now the principal’s choice of budgets. Using (4) in (2) we obtain the first-order con-
ditions
( ) 0 1 , , ˆ = - i i i b r b H b (7a) ( ) I E i r b H i i i r , ; 0 1 , , ˆ = = - b (7b).
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The full information optimum { }
* * * * , , , I I E E r b r b  can then be characterised as follows.
Proposition 1. (i) The efficient agent receives both a greater delegated and a greater con-
trolled budget, i.e. 
* *
I E b b >  and 
* *
I E r r > . (ii) Moral hazard leads to an upward (downward)
distortion in the degree of delegation for both types if and only if agents have a preference for
                                                                
14 The second-order condition holds if and only if  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] I E i H H H i br i rr i bb , ; 0 , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
2
= > ￿ - ￿ ￿ b b b . Using (4)
and observing  ( ) 1 2 < + r bE  and  I E b b > , it is readily checked that this is satisfied.9
(against) autonomy, i.e. if and only if  0 > a  ( 0 < a ). (iii) The principal delegates to greater
extent to the efficient agent, i.e. 
* *
I E D D > .
Proof: See Appendix.
The principal chooses the delegated and controlled budgets not only with a view to ‘techno-
logical’ efficiency but also with a view to eliciting effort. The optimal degree of delegation
under moral hazard can be written as
( ) ( )( ) ( )
I E i D D e h D D
i
i i i r i i i , ;
2

















 is the technologically efficient degree of delegation and where  i D ˆ , as defined
in (6), is the degree of delegation preferred by the agent. Here,  0
~ ˆ > ￿ > a i i D D  implies that
the agent prefers a degree of delegation over and above the technologically efficient level if
and only if he has a preference for autonomy. In this case, it is optimal for the principal to
over-delegate as this stimulates additional effort.
As an agent’s utility increases both in  b and  r , we have  ( ) ( ) i I I i E E r b U r b U b b , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * >  and
both types prefer the budget allocated to the E type.
15 While the principal can impose the
budgets under full information, inefficient agents have an incentive to misrepresent their type
under asymmetric information, thereby causing a problem of adverse selection.
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4 Allocation under asymmetric information when output is not contractible:
Screening by delegation
From now on, we consider the level of efficiency  b to be an agent’s private information, the
principal only being informed about the distribution of types. The principal’s problem is now
to  R
I E i t r b i i i , ; , ,
max
=
, as given in (2), subject to the self-selection constraints
( ) ( ) E I E E I I I I at r b U at r b U + ‡ + b b , , ˆ , , ˆ (ICI),
( ) ( ) I E I I E E E E at r b U at r b U + ‡ + b b , , ˆ , , ˆ , (ICE),
and the wealth constraints  0 ‡ E t  and  0 ‡ I t . Let  1 m  and  2 m  denote the multipliers associated
with the (ICI) and (ICE) constraint, respectively, and let  3 m  and  4 m  denote the multipliers
associated with the wealth constraints  0 ‡ I t  and  0 ‡ E t , respectively. We can then write the
first-order conditions associated with  I t ,  E t ,  I b ,  I r ,  E b  and  E r  as follows.
                                                                
15 In this, our model is similar to Harris and Raviv (1998). It is different, however, from the standard model (Laf-
font and Martimort 2002: section 2.3), where the efficient agent has an incentive to mimic the inefficient one.
The difference arises from the principal’s inability to fully extract rents in our model, on the one hand, and the
assumption of a common reservation utility in the standard model, on the other hand.
16 Note that a situation of natural separation may be possible if 
* *
I E b b >  and 
* *
I E r r < . This is ruled out for
Cobb-Douglas-preferences but may be possible for more general specifications of U ˆ .10
( ) ( ) 0 1 3 2 1 = + - + - - m m m l a (9a),
( ) 0 4 2 1 = + - - - m m m l a (9b),
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1 2 1 = - + - - E I I b I I I b I I I b r b U r b U r b H b m b m b l (9c),
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1 2 1 = - + - - E I I r I I I r I I I r r b U r b U r b H b m b m b l (9d),
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ
2 1 = + - - E E E b I E E b E E E b r b U r b U r b H b m b m b l (9e),
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ
2 1 = + - - E E E r I E E r E E E r r b U r b U r b H b m b m b l (9f).
17
Let  { }
* * * * * * * * * * * * , , , , , I I I E E E t r b t r b  denote the optimal allocation. The following Lemma will
prove helpful in understanding the structure of the shadow prices.
Lemma 1. The optimum entails (i)  0 2 1 ‡ > m m ; (ii)  0 4 > m ; (iii)  0 2 = m  if  I E D D >  or if
I E D D =  and  I E B B „ ; and (iv)  0 3 = m  if  I E D D <  or if  I E D D =  and  I E B B „ .
Proof: See Appendix.
According to part (i) of the Lemma an optimum always entails a binding (ICI). While (ICE)
will be slack in many cases, it cannot be ruled out that (ICI) and (ICE) bind simultaneously.
Part (ii) of the Lemma implies that it is always optimal to set  0
* * = E t . Part (iii) shows that
(ICE) binds only if either the degree of delegation has been reversed from the full information
situation such that  E I D D >  or if a full pooling equilibrium is realised. Likewise, according to
part (iv) the transfer to the I type must be positive, i.e.  0
* * > I t , either if the degree of delega-
tion is reversed or if the degree of delegation is pooled but not total budgets.
Agents are not motivated by monetary transfers:  0 = a
Consider now the special case  0 = a , where agents do not respond to financial incentives and
are merely motivated by the job. Obviously, it is then optimal for the principal to set
0
* * * * = = I E t t . Although this case may lack intuitive appeal we consider it in order to illus-
trate a set of first results.
18 The same results apply for a setting with  0 > a , as long as  a is
sufficiently low, i.e. as long as financial rewards are not too important in the agent’s utility.
We can then characterise as follows the degree of delegation assigned to each type in a sepa-
rating equilibrium.
                                                                
17 The second-order conditions are satisfied for  ( ) 1 2 < + r bE  if the parameter k  in the function  ( ) k U , ˆ ￿  is suffi-
ciently low.
18 One reason for  0 = a  may lie in a lexicographic preference ordering. Assume that instead of  at U V + = , the
agents’ preferences are given by  ( ) U t V , ˆ , where  ( ) ( ) ' , ' , ' ˆ , ˆ ' U U U t V U t V t t " > ￿ > . In this case, all agents
strictly prefer a greater salary irrespective of the budgetary allocation. In this case, the principal can attain sepa-
ration only if she sets  I E t t = , in case of which the monetary transfer becomes irrelevant for incentive purposes
and  0 = = I E t t .11
Lemma 2. The optimal levels of delegation 
* *
I D  and 
* *
E D  are given by
( )( ) ( )( ) E I
E I I r
I I
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Generally, the optimal degree of delegation under asymmetric information deviates from the
first-best levels with the direction of the deviation being determined by the sign of the 2
nd and
3
rd terms in (10a) and (10b). Here, (ICI) requires an increase (decrease) in the I type’s degree
of delegation if the agent prefers a degree of delegation,  I D ˆ , that exceeds (falls short of) the
degree of delegation 
*
I D , the principal would assign to this type under full information.
Likewise, (ICI) requires an increase (decrease) in the E type’s degree of delegation if  I D ˆ  falls
short of (exceeds) the degree of delegation 
*
E D  the principal would optimally assign to the E
type. Recall from Lemma 1 that  0 1 > m  is always true whereas  0 2 > m  requires 
* * * *
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= (12),
where  I E P b b b = =  is the pooling level of the controlled budget. Note that  ] [ r a a , ˆ ˛ . We
can now distinguish four regimes.
Lemma 3. (i) 
* * * * * * 0 E E I I D D D D < < < ￿ < a ; (ii)  [ [
* * * * * * , 0 E E I I D D D D < < £ ￿ ˛ a a ;
(iii)  [ [
* * * * * * ˆ , E E I I D D D D £ < < ￿ ˛ a a a ; (iv) 
P
I E D D D = = ￿ ‡
* * * * ˆ a a , where 
P D  is
the pooling degree of delegation.
Proof: See Appendix.
We thus know how the degree of delegation for each type evolves with the preference for
autonomy a. Before we discuss the different separating and the pooling allocation more fully
let us establish how the total budgets 
* *
E B  and 
* *
I B  develop with a.
Lemma 4. ( i) 
* * * * * * 0 E E I I B B B B < < < ￿ < a ; ( ii)
[ [ { } { }
* * * * * * , min , max ˆ , E I E I B B B B < ￿ ˛ a a a ; (iii) 
* * * * * * ˆ E E
P
I I B B B B B < = = < ￿ ‡a a ,
where 
P B  is the pooled total budget.12
Proof: See Appendix.
We observe immediately that the principal always under-budgets (over-budgets) the efficient
(inefficient) type relative to the first-best. Generally, self-selection requires that a rent is paid
to the informed agent, in our case the I type. This always involves an increase in the overall
budget paid to the I type. In this regard, our model is similar to the standard model of agency
(Laffont and Martimort 2002: section 2.6). In contrast to the standard case, however, rental
payments are directly associated with an efficiency loss due to the unproductive use of funds,
as can be seen from the first-order conditions (9e) and (9f), where the marginal product of  I b
and  I r , respectively, falls short of the marginal cost of funds. By reducing the E type’s budget
from its full information level, the principal lowers the attractiveness of mimicking this type
and is, thus, able to reduce the informational rent to the I type. In so doing, she trades-off the
efficiency losses for the two types. This resembles the finding by Harris and Raviv (1998),
where in the presence of an imperfect monitoring technology, the principal reacts to a situa-
tion of asymmetric information by reducing the gap in the budgets aimed at the efficient and
inefficient agent. Bearing this in mind, we can now focus on a number of more salient aspects
of the allocation under asymmetric information.
Proposition 2. (a) If agents have a preference for control ( 0 < a ), the principal over (under-)
delegates to the efficient (inefficient) type relative to the first-best. (b) If agents have a weak
preference for autonomy ( [ [ a a , 0 ˛ ), the principal over-delegates to both types. She pays a
greater total budget to the inefficient type if and only if the degree of delegation is sufficiently
high. (c) If agents have a strong preference for autonomy ( [ [ a a a ˆ , ˛ ), the principal under
(over-) delegates to the efficient (inefficient) type. She pays a greater total budget to the inef-
ficient type. (d) If agents have a very strong preference for autonomy ( [ ] r a a , ˆ ˛ ), the princi-
pal pools the degree of delegation and the budgets.
According to the agents’ preference for autonomy, we can, thus, distinguish four regimes,
three involving separation, (a)-(c), and one involving pooling, (d). The principal uses the de-
gree of delegation as an additional instrument in separating types. This is best illustrated with
reference to the benchmark case in which agents do not have preferences about the mode of
production, i.e., the degree of autonomy. In this case,  0 = a  which from (10a) and (10b) im-
plies  I E E D D D ˆ * * * > >  and  I I I D D D ˆ * * * = = . Since the I type prefers the same degree of
delegation as the principal, any deviation from the optimal level would only lead to a reduc-
tion in job satisfaction on the I type’s own contract and thus to an increase in the information
rent. In contrast, an increase in the E type’s degree of delegation renders this allocation less
attractive to the I type and, thereby, helps to contain the information rent and the associated
distortions in the budgets 
* *
I B  and 
* *
E B . Here, the principal introduces a second-order loss of
efficiency into the E type’s delegation in order to achieve a first-order gain in efficiency with
regard to the levels of budgets.
If the agent’s preference for autonomy deviates from the principal’s, i.e. if  0 „ a , the princi-
pal introduces a distortion into the inefficient type’s degree of autonomy, 
* * *
I I D D „ . The
reason is that the principal and the agent no longer agree on the optimal degree of delegation.
There is now scope for the principal to pay out a part of the informational rent by granting the
I type a more preferred mode of production and, thereby, reduce the rent paid in real resources
as well as the distortions in the E type’s allocation. If agents dislike autonomy, i.e. if  0 < a
[regime (a)], the agent’s preferred degree of autonomy  I D ˆ  lies below the one preferred by the13
principal 
*
I D . The principal can then enhance the I type’s utility on the own contract by re-
ducing the degree of delegation to a level  [ ]
* * * , ˆ
I I I D D D ˛ . Over-delegation to the E type i.e.
* * * *
I E E D D D > >  makes this allocation even less attractive, and, thus, allows a further reduc-
tion in the budgetary distortion.
If the preference a is positive but sufficiently low relative to the productivity spread  I E b b -
[regime (b)], the I type’s preferred degree of delegation lies between the first-best for the E
and I type respectively, i.e. 
* * ˆ
E I I D D D < < . It is then best for the principal to over-delegate
to the I type in order to contain the total budget  I B . But as the productivity spread is large, the
E type’s optimal degree of delegation is still unattractive for the I type and over-delegation to
E continues to be optimal. If  a is large relative to the productivity spread [regime (c)], gain-
ing greater autonomy becomes a very strong incentive for I when seeking to select E’s alloca-
tion. In fact, 
* ˆ
E I D D >  so that the I type prefers a degree of delegation in excess of the E
type’s first-best. While still over-delegating to I, the principal now optimally reduces the de-
gree of delegation to the E type below the full information level. While E types still receive
the greater degree of delegation, they now receive a total budget below the one assigned to I
types. This is illustrated in figure 2 a), with the budgetary assignments E to the E type and E’
to the I type. The dashed line  E EB B  gives the iso-budget curve corresponding to 
* *
E B , with
* * * *
I E B B < . With both E and E’ lying on the same indifference curve  I U ˆ , the I type is just
indifferent. Being more efficient under a greater degree of delegation, the E type strictly pre-
fers the allocation at E despite the lower overall budget. As total budgets are reversed, the
distortion goes beyond the rationing of capital for efficient types and the over-funding of inef-
ficient types as e.g. in Harris and Raviv (1998). Greater autonomy is now effectively traded


























Figure 2a: Separation in regime (b). Figure 2b: Non-existence of separation in regime (d).
Finally, for a very high preference for autonomy only a pooling allocation is feasible,
whereby both agents receive the same budget and the same degree of delegation [regime (d)].
Here, the agent’s preference for autonomy is so strong that the principal would effectively
have to assign a degree of delegation to the I type greater than the one assigned to the E type.
Figure 2 b) illustrates that this is impossible. Suppose E and E’ are assigned to the E and I
type, respectively, such that 
* * * *
I E D D < . While the I type is indifferent, this allocation vio-14
lates the E type’s incentive constraint (ICE). While a reduction in the overall budget to the
level at E’’ would restore incentive compatibility for the E type, it is now violated for the I
type. The best the principal can then attain is an allocation in which both budgets and the de-
gree of delegation are pooled.
From (ICI) and (ICE) one can derive the monotonicity condition
( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ , ˆ ‡ D ￿ + D ￿ D U B U I D I B b b b b (13),
with  I E B B B - = D  and  I E D D D - = D , that is necessary for the existence of a separating
allocation.
19 Satisfaction of (ICI) requires  ( )









, . Inserting this into (13) yields the
equivalent condition  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ , ˆ
,
, ‡ D ￿ + ￿ ￿
￿ - D U U I D I B U
U
I B
I D b b b b b
b . Inserting the appropriate deriva-
tives from (5) one can rewrite the condition to  ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 0
2
, ˆ 4 ‡ D ￿ ‡ D




U a r b . This condition
is violated in regime (d), where  a a ˆ >  would imply  0 < DD . The underlying reason is a di-
rect conflict between the incentive compatibility constraints (ICI) and (ICE) that cannot be
resolved in the absence of transfers.  Guesnerie and  Laffont (1984) call an environment in
which separation becomes unfeasible ‘non-responsive’. In their set-up and, similarly, in Laf-
font and Martimort (2002: section 2.10.2) non-responsiveness occurs as a result from a con-
flict between the allocation that maximises total surplus and the monotonicity condition. In
our case, this is different. It is easily checked that the maximisation of total surplus
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] I I E E U H U H b b l b b l , ˆ , ˆ 1 , ˆ , ˆ ￿ + ￿ - + ￿ + ￿  implies  0 > DD  and is, therefore, compati-
ble with monotonicity. Non-responsiveness occurs due to a conflict between rent extraction
(from the I type), requiring  0 < DD  and the monotonicity condition. In this case, separation
would increase rental payments by more than it would increase the value of production.
20
Agents are motivated by monetary transfers:  0 > a
Let us now characterise the allocation for the case  0 > a , where monetary transfers become
available to the principal as an additional tool to motivate agents. Specifically, the principal is
now able to pay out some of  the I type’s informational rent by way of a monetary transfer
0
* * > I t . Nonetheless, we will see that there are still cases in which the principal prefers not to
use monetary transfers at all. In  ( ) a , a  space we can identify five regimes for the budgetary
allocation corresponding to the areas I-V in figure 3, as developed in Lemma 5 and Corollary
L5. For the purpose of this illustration we focus on  0 ‡ a  without loss of generality.
                                                                
19 Here, we express utility in terms of total budget and degree of delegation,  ( ) b , , ˆ D B U . The appropriate func-
tion and derivatives are easily determined from (5) when setting  D
DB b + = 1  and  D
B r + = 1 .
20 Morand and Thomas (2003) provide, within a different set-up, conditions for such a clash between rent ex-
traction and monotonicity.15
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Figure 3: Budgetary regimes in ( ) a , a  space.
Lemma 5. ( i) Consider  a a ˆ < . There exists a function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 a a  such that
( ) a m a a £ ￿ >0 3 . (ii) Consider  a a ˆ ‡ . There exists a unique function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 a a  such
that  ( ) a m a a £ ￿ >0 3 ; a unique correspondence  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ a a  such that
( ) a m a a ˆ 0 2 £ ￿ > ; and a unique function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ ˆ a a  such that  ( ) a a a D D E I ˆ ˆ
* * * * £ ￿ ‡ .
(iii)  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ £ £  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a a a a = = = .
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark: The negative slope of the  ( ) a a  and  ( ) a a  schedules, as well as the positive slope of
the  ( ) a a ˆ ˆ  schedule can be established from the system (9a)-(9f) under use of the implicit
function theorem.
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I E D D .
Proof: See Appendix.
Area I: Here  0
* * = I t  and the allocation  { }
* * * * * * * * , , , I I E E D B D B  is, therefore, identical to the one
realised for  { } a a ˆ ; 0 < = a  as characterised in Proposition 2. Monetary transfers are not used as
their cost (in real resource terms) to the principal,  ( )
a
l - 1 , exceeds the cost of an inefficient
budget allocation as captured by the shadow price  1 m . This is the case if a weak preference
for money (a low  a) on the agent’s part would require the payment of substantial transfers in
order to improve the efficiency of the budget allocation. The negative slope of the  ( ) a a16
schedule indicates that for  0 > a  financial transfers are the less likely to be used the lower the
agents’ preference for autonomy. This is because the inefficiency in the budget allocation falls
as a decreases towards zero, where the agent’s and principal’s preferences with regard to
autonomy converge.
Area II: Here  0
* * > I t , where the cost of monetary transfers is sufficiently low to render effi-
cient the use of the monetary transfer as an additional screening instrument. This allows a
reduction in the screening-induced inefficiencies in budgeting. Specifically, for a higher  a the
principal increases 
* *
E B  (lowers 
* *
I B ), and, thereby, mitigates capital rationing of efficient
types (over-budgeting of inefficient types). A greater a also allows reducing the distortions in
the degree of autonomy allocated to each type. For instance, an increase in  a allows the prin-
cipal to mitigate the under- (over-) delegation towards the efficient (inefficient) type that
arises for  a a > .
Areas III and IV: Here,  0
* * > I t  and 
* * * *
I E D D < , implying a reversal of the degree of delega-
tion. The E type receives the greater budget, 
* * * *
I E B B >  which in area III is sufficient to guar-
antee a slack incentive constraint (ICE) for the E type. Nonetheless, the budgetary allocation
is perverse in that the principal assigns the greater degree of delegation to the I type despite its
lower productivity in the use of the delegated budget.
21 This distortion increases as the prefer-
ence for monetary rewards  a falls. A lower effectiveness of monetary transfers in inducing
self-selection on the part of  the I type also implies that the principal has to close the gap
0
* * * * > - I E B B . As the E type’s allocation is thus rendered less and less attractive, this leads to
a situation in area IV where the incentive constraints bind for both types.
Area V: Here  0
* * = I t , where the preference for monetary rewards,  a, has dropped by so
much that it is no longer efficient for the principal to use transfers. While this regime is akin
to regime I in this regard, the high preference for autonomy rules out a separating allocation.
Thus, the budget allocation is fully pooled, where 
* * * *
I E D D =  and 
* * * *
I E B B = . The negatively
sloped  ( ) a a  schedule implies that financial incentives are more likely to be used - and pool-
ing is thus the less likely - the greater the agents’ preference for autonomy and, therefore, the
greater the distortions in the budget allocation. We can summarise as follows.
Proposition 3. (i) The principal uses financial incentives if and only if the agent’s preference
for financial rewards over job-satisfaction is sufficiently high. (ii) Budgets are fully pooled if
the preference for financial rewards is sufficiently low, and the preference for autonomy is
sufficiently high but not too high. (iii) The degree of delegation is reversed if the preference
for autonomy is sufficiently high and the preference for financial rewards is at an intermedi-
ate level.
The principal will not always use financial instruments to motivate agents’ self-selection even
if they are available. This applies even if agents have a preference for financial rewards,
0 > a , as long as it is weak relative to their preference over other job attributes – in our case
the satisfaction from a job done under some preferred degree of autonomy. It is then less
costly for the principal to distort the budget allocation rather than to use financial rewards. As
the preference for autonomy grows, the principal can induce separation only by introducing
increasingly stronger distortions into the budgets. Specifically, she will have to render more
                                                                
21 This notwithstanding the efficient type still receives the greater delegated budget, i.e. 
* * * *
I E b b > .17
similar the degree of delegation. Full pooling of budgets emerges if rent extraction leads to a
conflict between the two types’ incentive constraints. Notably, pooling arises not only as a
corner solution for  0 = a , but it is supported by a range of pairs  ( ) a , a  in region V. Although
the principal could break a pooling equilibrium by use of financial transfers, she refrains from
this when agents are disinterested in financial rewards and their motivation requires ineffi-
ciently high payments.
22
Why separation is feasible within regime IV (and similarly within regime III) can be under-
stood as follows. Both incentive constraints (ICE) and (ICI) continue to bind within regime
IV, as they did within the pooling regime V. In contrast to regime V, however, the efficient
use of financial transfers allows the principal to reconcile the conflicting self-selection con-
straints. This is illustrated in figure 2b. Consider the budget allocations E to the E type and I
to the I type, where  0 < - = D I E D D D  and  0 > - = D I E B B B . While allocation E is pre-
ferred by both types, the principal sets the transfer  0
* * > I t  such that (ICI) is just binding.
(ICE) is then satisfied if the monotonicity condition (13) holds. Satisfaction of (ICI) requires
( )












￿ - + D = D . Inserting into (13) first this and then the appropriate derivatives
from (5) yields the equivalent condition  ( ) ( )
( ) 0 ,
, ˆ 4
2










a r b . Since  0 > a  allocations
involving  0 < DD  are now feasible. Here, the spread in budgets  0 > DB  can be made suffi-
ciently large to induce the E type to self-select despite of a lower degree of delegation and a
lower financial transfer.
5  Allocation under full information when output is contractible
In this section we study the case in which output is verifiable (scenario 2), which allows the
principal to link the agent’s compensation to output and not merely to the budget allocation.
As before, we establish as a benchmark the allocation when the principal can observe the
agent’s type  b but not effort (i.e. moral hazard only), before moving on to the case in which
the principal is uninformed about the agent’s type  b and effort (i.e. adverse selection cum
moral hazard). When output is contractible the principal pays a transfer  i t  to agent  I E i , =  if
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Note that under the wealth constraint the principal cannot punish the agent for deviations from
the target. As there is no uncertainty involved in production we are dealing with a case of
‘false moral hazard’ (e.g. Laffont and Martimort 2002: section 7.1.4). Given the budget allo-
cation  { } i i r b ,  a production target  i H  implies an effort  i e .
23 We can then write the moral haz-
ard constraint for type i as
                                                                
22 While we have derived this finding for linear preferences in money, the result easily extends to more general
utility functions  ( ) t w . Here, pooling is sustained if the marginal utility from money  ( ) t w'  is sufficiently low
when evaluated at the wealth constraint  0 t t =  (in our case normalised to zero).
23 If the principal refuses to pay the transfer for  ( ) i i i i i H r b e H > b , , , , this may be viewed as an undue restriction
of the agent’s performance. However, as we show shortly, the effort 
*
i e  that maximises the agent’s utility al-18
( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i r b e U r b e U at b b , , , , , ,
* - ‡ ,  I E i , = (MHi),
where  ( ) i i i i r b e U b , , ,
*  is the agent’s utility when foregoing the transfer and supplying effort
( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i r b e U r b e e b b , , , ˆ max arg , , ˆ
* = = . The principal chooses { } I E i t r b e i i i i , , , , , =  so as to
maximise 
i i e e R = , as given in (2), subject to the two moral hazard constraints (MHE) and
(MHI). The allocation under full information  { } E I i t r b e i i i i , ; , , , =
+ + + +  can then be character-
ised as follows.
Proposition 4. ( i) The principal uses performance pay
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , , , , , ,
* 1 > - =
+
i i i i i i i i a i D B e U D B e U t b b  to stimulate effort beyond the level the agent
would choose, i.e.  ( )
* * , , i i i i i i e e r b ah e > + =
+ b . (ii) The principal offers a greater reward to
the efficient type, i.e., 
+ + > I E t t , and this type provides greater effort, i.e. 
+ + > I E e e . (iii) The
degree of delegation 
+
i D  is smaller (greater) than the one implemented with contractible out-
put under full information, 
*
i D , if  0 > a  ( 0 < a ).
Proof: See Appendix.
When output is contractible, the principal can use financial rewards to stimulate effort beyond
the level that would be volunteered even by a motivated agent. Notably, as long as agents are
intrinsically motivated the rewards need only reflect the agent’s utility loss vis-à-vis their
utility maximising level of effort, which is significantly less than the full effort cost.
24 The
extent to which the principal can stimulate extra effort is governed by the agent’s responsive-
ness to financial rewards,  a. As the greater effort (as compared to the situation of non-
contractible output) raises the marginal product of the budgetary inputs, the principal also
allocates greater total budgets for both types. The degree of delegation is now given by
( ) ()














As before, there is over-delegation if and only if the agent has a preference for autonomy, i.e.
if and only if  0 > a , the efficient agent receiving a greater degree of delegation. However,
budgets are distorted for a different reason now. In the absence of transfers, the distortion was
chosen as to increase the agent’s marginal benefit from providing effort. When output is con-
tractible, the principal can stimulate effort more directly by setting an appropriate target  i H .
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
ways falls short of the effort 
*
i e  that maximises the principal’s surplus. Thus,  ( ) i i i i i H r b e H < b , , ,
*  and the
target never imposes an upward constraint on the agent’s effort. However, as we will see in the next section (see
footnote 26), paying the transfer for  ( ) I E I I E H r b e H > b , , ,  may in some cases harden the E type’s incentive
constraint. The principal optimally rules this out by paying the transfer only if the target is met.
24 This relies on the implicit assumption that financial incentives do not replace the agent’s non-financial moti-
vation. In reality, crowding out of intrinsic motivation may matter (Frey 1993, 1997; Bénabou and Tirole 2003,
Grepperud and Pedersen 2004). This complication would not alter our more substantive results.
25 Since  ( )
+
i D u  is included on the RHS of (14), this only gives an implicit definition of 
+
i D . It is readily veri-
fied that a unique value of 
+
i D  satisfies the equation.19
The distortion in the budgets away from their technologically optimal levels now arises for
reasons of rent extraction. By rendering the budget allocation more attractive to the agent, e.g.
by granting more autonomy, this helps the principal to contain the transfer payment that is
necessary to implement any given effort  i e . The financial rewards are, thus, leveraged and
greater levels of effort can be stimulated. Finally, note that the availability of performance pay
allows the principal to reduce the distortion in the degree of delegation away from the tech-
nological optimum, where  i i i i D D D D
~ ~ * - > -
+ .
6  Allocation under asymmetric information when output is contractible
Here, the principal can design an output related reward scheme, but she is unable to observe
the agents’ type. To explore the optimal contract under asymmetric information we introduce
some additional notation. Let
( ) ( ) i j j i i j j ij r b e U r b e e b b , , , max arg , , ˆ :
* = = ,  { } I E j i , , ˛














:= ,  { } I E j i , , ˛
denote the effort type  i needs to expend in order to meet type  j ’s performance target
( ) j j j jj j r b h e H b , , = . It can then be shown that the agents do not self-select naturally. Specifi-
cally,  ( ) ( ) ( ) b b b , , , , , , , , ,
* * + + + + + + + < = + E E IE I I I II I I I I II r b Ue r b e U at r b e U , where the inequality
follows from 
+ + ‡ I E b b  and 
+ + ‡ I E r r . Hence, the I type could always increase utility by tak-
ing the E type’s allocation and choosing the preferred effort.
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The principal’s problem is then to  R
I E i t r b e i i i i , ; , , ,
max
=
, as given in (2), subject to the moral hazard
constraints (MHI) and (MHE), the self-selection constraints
( ) ( ) ( ) { } I E E IE E I E E IE I I I I II r b e U at r b e U at r b e U b b b , , , , , , , max , , ,
* + ‡ + (ICI’),
( ) ( ) ( ) { } E I I EI I E I I EI E E E E EE r b e U at r b e U at r b e U b b b , , , , , , , max , , ,
* + ‡ + , (ICE’),
                                                                
26 It can be shown that
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) { } E I I EI I E I I EI
E E E EE
E E E E EE r b e U at r b e U
r b e U




, , , , , , , max
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, , , *
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implying that the E type self-selects naturally. Incidentally, this illustrates why it is not optimal for the principal
to grant performance rewards if output is in excess of the target. It can be checked that  EI EI e e >
*  if  a  is suffi-
ciently low. In this case the E type would produce  ( ) I E I I EI H r b h e > b , ,
*  when choosing 
*
EI e . If the principal
rewards output in excess of  I H , the E type attains utility
( ) ( ) ( ) { } E I I EI I E I I EI I E I I EI r b e U at r b e U at r b e U b b b , , , , , , , max , , ,
* * + > + , implying that the incentive constraint is
hardened. It can be shown that  ( ) ( ) I IE I I EI E E E EE at r b e U r b e U + >
+ + + + b b , , , , , ,
* *  is not always satisfied.20
and the wealth constraints  0 ‡ E t  and  0 ‡ I t .
From Proposition 4, part (i), we know that in the case of contractible output it is always opti-
mal to set  I E i ti , ; 0 = > . Hence, we can ignore the wealth constraints. Combining the moral
hazard and self-selection constraints, we obtain
( )
( )
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E I E E IE
I I I I II r b e U r b e U
at r b e U
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I E I I EI
E E E E EE r b e U r b e U
at r b e U




, , , , , , ,
, , , ,
max , , ,
* * (15b).
In order to identify the relevant constraints let us, for a moment, consider all six candidate
constraints, where 
i
1 m , 
i
2 m  and 
i
3 m ,  I E i , =  denote the shadow prices for the constraint relat-
ing to the first, second and third element in bracelets on the RHS of (15a) and (15b), respec-
tively. The first-order conditions with respect to { } I E i r b e t i i ii i , , , , , =  are then given by
( ) ( ) 0 1 1 3 2 1 = - + + + - -
E I I I a m m m m l (16a), ( ) 0 1 3 2 1 = - + + + -
I E E E a m m m m l (16b),
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , , , , , , , , , , , 1 1
1 = - - + - I I I II e E I I EI e
E
I I I II e a I I I r b e U r b e U r b e U r b h b b m b b l (16c),
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , , , , , , , , , , , 1
1 = - - + E E E EE e I E E IE e
I
E E E EE e a E E E r b e U r b e U r b e U r b h b b m b b l (16d),
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
0
, , , , , , , , ,
















- - + -
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E
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E
I I I II x
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I I I II x a I I I x II
r b e U r b e U r b e U
r b e U r b e U r b h e
b m b b m
b m b b l
;  r b x , = (16e/f),
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( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
0
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I E E IE x
I
E E E EE x I E E IE x
I
E E E EE x
E
E E E EE x a E E E x EE
r b e U r b e U r b e U
r b e U r b e U r b h e
b m b b m
b m b b l
;  r b x , = (16g/h).
As is common for models of mixed adverse selection and moral hazard, there is no clear-cut
rule to determine the binding constraints within (15a) and (15b) and, thus, to determine which
of the shadow prices should be positive.
Case 1:  0 1 1 = =
I E m m
If  0 1 1 = =
I E m m  neither type has an incentive to mimic the other in order to attain the per-
formance reward. We can then characterise the allocation under asymmetric information,
{ } I E i D B e t i i ii i , , , , , =
+ + + + + + + + , as follows.
Proposition 5. ( i) There is no distortion in the performance targets/effort levels, i.e.
( )
* , , i i i i i e r b ah e + =
+ + b . The budget allocation follows a pattern similar to figure 3. Specifi-
cally, (ii) the principal chooses the transfers  ( ) ( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i a i D B e U D B e U t b b , , , , , ,
* 1 - =
+ +  to21
address moral hazard alone for  ( ) [ ] a
+ ˛ i a a , 0 , where  ( ) ( ) I E i ai , ; , 0 = ¥ ˛
+ a ,  (iii) and
budgets are pooled, i.e.  P E I B B B = =
+ + + +  and  P E I D D D = =
+ + + + , for all pairs  ( ) a , a  satis-
fying  ( ) [ ] a
+ ˛ i a a , 0 ,  I E i , = , and  a a ˆ > , with a ˆ  as defined in (12).
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Proof: See Appendix.
Performance targets (conditional on the budget allocation) remain undistorted. This is not
surprising as in the present case we have assumed that a misrepresentation of type is not mo-
tivated by a desire to attain a more preferred performance target/payment. For the same reason
the budget allocation is similar to the one realised in the case of non-contractible output (see
figure 3 and Proposition 3). If the preference for financial rewards is weak, the principal uses
them only to induce effort but not to facilitate the agents’ self-selection. In this case the budg-
ets are pooled if the preference for autonomy is sufficiently high (but not too high). As dis-
cussed before, pooling arises when rent-extraction conflicts with the E type’s self-selection
constraint, while the cost of financial transfers exceeds the gains from a more efficient sepa-
rating allocation. We conclude by establishing a condition for the allocation just described.
Lemma 8: The allocation  { } I E i D B e t i i ii i , , , , , =
+ + + + + + + +   is implemented if and only if
v
*
IE II e e £ , with  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 :
, , , , , ,






I I I II E I I EI
I E E IE E E E EE
r b e U r b e U
r b e U r b e U
b b
b b v .
Proof: See Appendix
This requires that the effort level assigned to the I type be sufficiently low. Otherwise, the E
type has an incentive to mimic the I type and capture the performance payment at a low effort.
Since  ( )
* , , II I I I II e r b ah e + =
+ + b  the condition is satisfied if (and only if) the preference for
autonomy, a, is not too large.
Case 2:  0 1 1 = >
I E m m
Suppose now  v
*
IE II e e >  so that  0 1 >
E m , implying that the E type has an incentive to mimic
the I type. The following can then be shown.
Lemma 9:  0 1 =
I m  if and only if  ( )
( ) [ ] { } ( )
( ) [ ] { }
2 2
, ,
, , 2 2
, ,
, , 1 1 II r b h
r b h
EE r b h








b - ‡ - .
Proof: See Appendix.
In this case, the I type does not aspire to attain the E type’s performance reward. Transfers are
then given by  ( ) ( ) [ ] E E E EE E I I EI a E r b e U r b e U t b b , , , , , , 1 - =  and
( ) ( ) [ ] I I I II I E E IE a I r b e U r b e U t b b , , , , , ,
* 1 - = . It is easy to establish from (16a)-(16h) the fol-
lowing features of the equilibrium allocation.
                                                                
27 Note that  ( ) [ ] a
+ ˛ i a a , 0 ,  I E i , = , and  a a ˆ >  are sufficient for pooling. Pooling also arises for some  a a ˆ < .
Thus, the presence of performance pay makes pooling more likely. This is due to the relative increase in the E
type’s budgets in the presence of performance pay.22
Proposition 6. Consider  0 1 1 = >
I E m m . (i) Then, the E type’s effort 
+ + +
E e  is not distorted away
from the full information level but the I type’s effort 
+ + +
I e  is distorted downwards. (ii) IC con-
straints bind for both types. (iii) The E type’s budget allocation is as depicted in Proposition
5, and (iv) the I type’s total budget 
+ + +
I B  and the degree of delegation 
+ + +
I D  are distorted
downwards from the levels described in Proposition 5.
Proof: See Appendix.
If the preference for financial rewards is sufficiently high, the E type has an incentive to
mimic the I type and reap this type’s performance reward. This conforms to the set-up of
many standard models with ‘false moral hazard’ and adverse selection (e.g. Laffont and Mar-
timort 2002: section 7.4.1). Here, the principal’s response is to lower the I type’s target (and
effort) as well as the degree of delegation assigned to this type. In so doing, she makes the I
type’s allocation less attractive to the E type and extracts some of the informational rent. In
contrast to the standard model, however, the E type’s allocation remains distorted as described
in Proposition 5. This is because the self-selection constraint for the I type remains binding.
Indeed, in this particular instance adverse selection incentives arise for both types. While the
E type seeks to obtain the more attractive package of performance pay offered to the I type,
the I type seeks to obtain the more attractive budget allocation designated to the E type with-
out aiming to attain the performance target. The principal responds to the compounded incen-
tive problem by using the I type’s performance target as an additional instrument.
7  Heterogeneity in the preference for autonomy
We have carried out our analysis assuming that agent heterogeneity mainly relates to the pro-
ductivity of the agent or the project they are carrying out. At the same time we have main-
tained that agents have similar preferences for autonomy. It has been suggested that agents
self-select into organisations (or occupations) according to their preference for job character-
istics rather than their productivity (Dixit 2002 Besley and Ghatak 2003). In this case, pro-
ductivity becomes the distinguishing characteristic within an organisation as we have a s-
sumed. Alternatively, one could argue that agents working within the same organisation sub-
stantively differ in the degree to which they prefer autonomy. We will now demonstrate that
this case does not lead to significantly different results. Assume thus that agents differ in their
preference for autonomy, where  { } H L a a a , ˛ , with  H L a a < . It is then readily verified that
( ) i i U D
i
i a a r
a b , ˆ max arg ˆ ￿ = = -
+  and  ( ) i i H D
i
i a a r
a b , ˆ max arg 2
2 * ￿ = = -
+ , where  L H i , = . As before
over delegation vis-à-vis the technological optimum  r
b = D
~
 occurs under complete informa-
tion if and only if agents have a preference for autonomy, i.e.  0
~ * > ￿ > i i D D a . At the same
time, the ‘better motivated’ H type receives greater budgets  L H b b ‡ ,  L H r r ‡  along both the
controlled and delegated dimension, causing adverse selection incentives on the part of the L
type. Supposing that financial transfers are not used (small  a), the allocation  { }
* * * * , i i B D  un-
der asymmetric information can be summarised as follows.
Proposition 7. (i) There is over-delegation to the L type, 
* * *
L L D D > , if and only if  0 > L a . (ii)
There is under-delegation to the H type, 
* * *
H H D D < , if and only if  H L a a 2
1 > . (iii) There ex-
ists  ( ] H H a a a , 2
1 ˛  such that pooling ensues for  [ ] H L a a a , ˛  if  1 ln
* ‡ H H D a .23
Proof: See Appendix.
These findings are notable on two grounds. For  0 ‡ L a , the distortion in the allocation de-
creases with the degree of heterogeneity between agents, as measured by the spread  L H a a - .
Second, pooling may then become attractive if the agents become sufficiently similar. This is
the case when the preference for autonomy on the part of the H type  H a  is sufficiently strong
and/or if delegation is productive such that  r b >> , implying a high 
*
H D . Hence, pooling is
the outcome if delegation is strongly preferred by all types as well as by the principal.
8  Conclusions
We have studied a principal agent model of budget delegation to illuminate some of the im-
plications of agents’ preferences for autonomy. The principal faces both a moral hazard and
adverse selection problem to which she can react by adjusting the levels of budgets allocated
to an agent, the control she retains as well as a payment to the agent. Under full information
about agent’s productivity the principal adjusts the budget and its delegation in order to
stimulate additional effort or – in case of performance pay – in order to reduce the payment.
Our key results relate to the case in which the principal is uninformed about the agent’s type,
the productivity under delegation. Contracts turn out to be sensitive to the agent’s preference
for autonomy and to the trade-off between job satisfaction and financial transfers. Generally,
if agents strongly prefer job satisfaction to financial transfers, the latter will not be used in
order to facilitate self-selection. A separating allocation can then be attained only if prefer-
ences for autonomy are not too strong. The distortion in the degree of delegation depends on
the agents’ preference for autonomy. If agents are indifferent to autonomy, a separating allo-
cation requires over-delegation to the efficient type and no distortion for the inefficient type.
For an increasing preference for autonomy the gap in the degree of delegation is gradually
closed and a pooling allocation is reached when the preference for autonomy is sufficiently
strong. This form of non-responsiveness arises when the agent’s and the principal’s prefer-
ences regarding the allocation of autonomy are sufficiently divergent. Separation remains
feasible when the agent’s preference for financial transfers is sufficiently strong. In this case,
strong preferences for autonomy lead to a reversal in the degree of delegation. These results
highlight the important implications of divergent preferences with regard to the mode of pro-
duction.
From an empirical perspective one would expect that budget allocations will be less sensitive
to differences in the productivity of agents managing a delegated budget within those organi-
sations or organisational units that rely on agents with a strong preference for autonomy. In-
deed, pooling is the likely outcome if strong preferences for autonomy are coupled with weak
interest in financial rewards relative to job-satisfaction. Cursory evidence suggests that this
ties-in rather well with the prevalence of weaker performance incentives within such organi-
sations. (Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999, Francois 2000, Dixit 2002, Besley and Ghatak 2003).
A tendency towards pooled budgets within such organisations may be viewed critically in that
it implies misallocation of funds both to productive and unproductive agents. However, it
should be borne in mind that pooling is an optimal response to the agents’ strong focus on
job-satisfaction, which could only be swung by excessive financial transfers. Furthermore, the
productivity gains from intrinsically motivated agents may well over-compensate the lack of
efficiency in the budget allocation.
While we derive the main results for the case in which output (and effort) are non-
contractible, we show that their substance carries over to the case of contractible output. We24
also show that similar results hold in a situation in which agent heterogeneity pertains with
regard to the preference for autonomy. A number of limitations and possible extensions de-
serve discussion. First, we assume that the agent’s input, effort, and the principal’s inputs, the
budgets, are complements in production. This implies that the principal, acting as first-mover,
can stimulate additional effort by increasing the budgets. More generally, budgets and effort
may also be substitutes, in case of which the principal would reduce her own input.
28 How-
ever, as long as the efficient type receives the greater budget and greater degree of delegation,
this would not substantively alter our analysis of budgeting under asymmetric information.
Second, we assume that productivity is the agent’s private information and the principal uses
the budgets to screen agents. Alternatively, one could follow Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and
assume that the principal is informed about the productivity of the project and thus its value to
the agent. In this case, the principal could signal to the agent a productive/attractive project by
over-budgeting and over-delegating to an extent that would not be profitable for the non-
productive project. However, separation may not be possible if a high preference for auton-
omy on the part of the agent and the ensuing effort incentives make it profitable to over-
delegate to all types. Third, we have disregarded the effects of uncertainty. One way of intro-
ducing risk into the present framework is to model output as a random variable, where the
agent’s type  b corresponds to the probability of making effective use of the delegated
budget. As risk is attached to the use of the delegated budget more than to the use of the
regulated budget the principal has an incentive to under-delegate relative to the first-best in
order to reduce the agent’s risk premium. The presence of risk-aversion may have a positive
bearing on the feasibility of separation. As the inefficient agent faces a greater probability of
failure under delegation, aversion to this risk reduces the incentive to aspire for the efficient
agent’s allocation. Thus, for high levels of a risk contributes to reducing the distortion in the
separating allocation. If agents are very risk averse, the presence of risk may even reverse the
incentive problem.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) Follows from comparative static analysis for the system (7a) and (7b) under use of (4).



































a r . Obviously then,  0
* > a d







implying the statements in part (ii) and (iii).n
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i)  We prove  0 1 > m  by contradiction. Suppose  0 1 = m . For  0 2 ‡ m , it follows from (9c)-
(9f) that the equilibrium values  { }
* * * * * * * * , , , I I E E r b r b  satisfy
* * * * * * * * * * * * ; ; ; I I I I E E E E r r b b r r b b £ £ ‡ ‡ , where the values with the single asterisk correspond
to the unconstrained problem. Hence,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I I I I I I I E E I E E r b U r b U r b U r b U b b b b , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * * * * * * * * * ‡ > ‡ , where the strict inequality
has been shown to hold true for the unconstrained solution. But then,
( ) ( ) I I I I E E r b U r b U b b , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * * * * * > , which contradicts  0 1 = m .
To prove  2 1 m m >  by contradiction suppose  1 2 m m ‡ . From (9a) this implies  0 3 > m  and,
therefore,  0 = I t . (ICE) and (ICI) then imply
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ‡ - = - = I E E I I I E E E E I I E r b U r b U r b U r b U at b b b b (A1),
where the inequality follows from the wealth constraint. Using (9c) and (9d), we obtain
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) E I I b I I I b I I I b r b U r b U r b H b m b m b l , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1 0 2 1 - + - - =
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1
0
1 - - < - + - - £
<
I I I b E I I b I I I b I I I b r b H r b U r b U r b H b l b b m b l
4 4 4 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 7 6
,
and, likewise,
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1 0 2 1 - - < - + - - = I I I r E I I r I I I r I I I r r b H r b U r b U r b H b l b m b m b l
implying 
* * *
I I b b <  and 
* * *
I I r r < . Similarly, one obtains from (9e) and (9f) 
* * *
E E b b >  and
* * *
E E r r > . Together with  ( ) ( ) i I I i E E r b U r b U b b , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * >  this implies
( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * * * * * < - i E E i I I r b U r b U b b , which contradicts (A1).
(ii)  0 4 > m  follows from (9b) under observation of  2 1 m m > .28
(iii)  Assuming  I E D D >  we use figure 2a to show that this contradicts  0 2 > m .
29 Consider
the allocations  { } E E D B E , =  and  { } I I D B I , = , obviously satisfying  I E D D > . Since
2 1 m m > , it follows from  0 2 > m  that both (ICE) and (ICI) bind simultaneously. Noting
0 0 4 = ￿ > E t m  and the constraint  0 ‡ I t  it must be true that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ‡ - = - = E E I I I I U E U I U E U at b b b b . By construction, the allocations
{ } I E D B E , ' '=  and  { } I E D B E , ' ' ' ' =  satisfy  ( ) ( ) I I E U E U b b , ' ˆ , ˆ =  and  ( ) ( ) E E E U E U b b , ' ' ˆ , ˆ = .
Consequently,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ , ' ' ˆ , ˆ , ' ˆ ‡ - = - = E E I I I I U E U I U E U at b b b b (A2).
For not too large differences in the budgets  0 ' ' > - I E B B  and  0 ' > - I E B B , the second equality
in (A2) implies  ( )( ) ( )( ) I E I B I E E B B B U B B U - ￿ = - ￿ ' , ˆ ' ' , ˆ b b . Since  ( ) ( ) I B E B U U b b , ˆ , ˆ ￿ > ￿  this im-
plies  ' ' ' E E B B > , a contradiction. Hence,  0 2 > m  is incompatible with  I E D D > .
We go on to show that  0 2 > m  contradicts  I E D D =  and  I E B B „ . To see this, consider the
allocations E and  { } E I D B I , ' '=  in figure 2a. Here,  0 2 > m  implies
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ' ˆ , ˆ , ' ˆ , ˆ ‡ - = - = E E I I I I U E U I U E U at b b b b . For small differences in budgets
0 '> - I E B B , this implies  ( )( ) ( )( ) ' , ˆ ' , ˆ
I E I B I E E B B B U B B U - ￿ = - ￿ b b . For  ( ) ( ) I B E B U U b b , ˆ , ˆ ￿ > ￿
this is satisfied if and only if  ' I E B B = , a contradiction.
(iv)  Assume by contradiction that  0 3 > m  and  I E D D <  are simultaneously true. Noting that
0 3 > m  implies  0 = I t , it follows that (ICI) requires  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = - I E E I I I D B U D B U b b . This
would, indeed, be satisfied by the allocations  { } E E D B E , =  and  { } I I D B E , '=  in figure 2b.
However, it is immediately established that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ' ˆ , ˆ 0 , ' ˆ , ˆ < - ￿ = - E E I I E U E U E U E U b b b b  implying that (ICE) is violated. Hence,
0 3 > m  and  I E D D <  cannot hold at the same time. Consider now  I E D D = . Since  0 3 > m
implies  0 = = E I t t , it follows from (ICI) and (ICE) that  I E B B = . Hence,  I E D D =  and
I E B B „  imply  0 3 = m .n
Proof of Lemma 2: Equating the LHS of (9c) and (9d), and rearranging gives
( )
( )
( ) [ ] ( )
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( ) [ ]
( )
( )
( ) [ ]
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1-  to both sides yields
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implying that for every pair ( ) b r,  the I type’s indifference curves are steeper sloped than the E type’s.29
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where the second equality follows under observation of
( ) ( ) ( ). , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 1 1
2 1




- - - = -  as from (9d). Inserting the relevant
derivatives from (4) and (5) into (A3) and rearranging yields






















+ - + - + = =
E I I I I
I
I
E I I r I I I r r
b









Employing the definitions in (6) and (8) then gives the term in (10a). Starting from (9e) and
(9f), it is straightforward to derive (10b) in a similar fashion.n
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i)  From (6) and (8), 
* ˆ 0 I I D D < ￿ < a . For  0 2 = m  it follows from (10a) and (10b) that
* * *
I I D D <  and 
* * *
E E D D < . Since 
* *
I E D D < , it follows immediately that
* * * * * *
E E I I D D D D < < < , where the inequalities imply  0 2 = m  from part (iii) Lemma 1.
(ii)  Since  I I D D ˆ 0
* £ ￿ ‡ a , it follows from (10a) that 
* * *
I I D D £ for  0 2 = m . From (6),
(8) and (11), we obtain that 
* ˆ
E I D D < ￿ <a a . For  0 2 = m , it then follows from (10b) that
* * *
E E D D < . Hence,  [ [
* * * * * * , 0 E E I I D D D D < < £ ￿ ˛ a a , where the middle inequality is
consistent with  0 2 = m .
(iii) and (iv) Since  I E D D ˆ * £ ￿ ‡a a , it follows from (10b) that 
* * *
E E D D £  for  0 2 = m .
With 
* * *
I I D D < , we have to prove that 
* * * * ˆ I E D D > ￿ <a a . Using (10a) and (10b) we ob-
tain
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]





, , ˆ , , ˆ
2 1
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or after employing (9d) and (9f) and rearranging
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) 0 ˆ ˆ
1
, , ˆ , , ˆ
2
* * * * ‡ - + + ￿ ‡ - I E
r b U r b U
I E D D Z D D





( )( ) ( )( ) I I I I I r I E E E E r D D r b H D D r b H Z ˆ , , ˆ ˆ , , ˆ * * - - - = b b .30
Inserting the appropriate derivatives from (4) and rearranging terms we can rewrite
( )( ) ( ) [ ]
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.
Assume for the moment  0 2 = m  and consider a pooling allocation  { } P I E P I E r r r b b b = = = = ;
that satisfies
{ }
( )( ) ( ) [ ]

















+ - - -
+ - + -
= - = = = =
- -
a b a r






P I P E b kr




P I E P I E b b
b b
Z .
It is readily verified that this implies 
( )
( ) ( ) a a b b
b
b r b b r













b . Note that  ] [ r a a , ˆ ˛ .
From comparative static analysis of the system  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = - I E E I I I r b U r b U b b , where
0 = I t , (9a) and (9c)-(9f) each with  0 2 = m  we obtain after tedious calculations
( ) 0
0 ; ; 2
** **
< -
= = = = = m a a P I E P I E
I E
B B B D D D d
dD
d
dD . Note that for  0 = a  and, therefore, for  0 = = I E t t , (ICI)
and (ICE) imply  I E I E B B D D = ￿ = . Hence,  0 0 ; 0 ; 0 2 < = = = m a Z a d
dZ . But then,




























= a Z (A5).
Recall from Lemma 1, part (ii) that  0 2
* * * * = ￿ > m I E D D . Hence, from (A4)  0 0 2 = ￿ > m Z .
Considering  0 = Z , we can prove by contradiction that this implies  0 2 = m . Suppose  0 = Z
and  0 2 > m  hold at the same time. In this case, it follows from (A4) that 
* * * *
I E D D > , contra-
dicting  0 2 > m . Hence,  0 0 2 = ￿ ‡ m Z  must be true.
From (A4) and (A5) it follows 
* * * * ˆ I E D D ‡ ￿ £a a , with a strict inequality on the RHS im-
plying and being implied by one on the LHS. Finally, consider  a a ˆ > . From (A5), this im-
plies  0 0 < = a Z . For  0 = a  and, therefore, for  0 = = I E t t , (ICI) and (ICE) imply
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * = - = - I E E I I I E E E E I I r b U r b U r b U r b U b b b b . However, it is read-
ily checked from figure 2b that for the utility specification in (5), this is only satisfied for a
pooling allocation, i.e. for { } P I E P I E r r r b b b = = = =
* * * * * * * * ; . Hence, 
* * * * ˆ I E D D = ￿ >a a .n
Corollary: As  0 0 < = a Z  and 
* * * *
I E D D =  both hold for  a a ˆ > , it follows from (A4) that
0 ˆ 0 2 > ￿ > = a m a a .n
Proof of Lemma 4: From the first-order conditions (9e) and (9f), respectively, it follows for
0 2 = m  that  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1 > = + =
E
b I E E b E E E b r b U r b H V b b l
m  and
( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ 1 > = + =
E
r I E E r E E E r r b U r b H V b b l
m . As  ( ) 0 , ˆ > ￿ I b U b ,  ( ) 0 , ˆ > ￿ I r U b  and  0 1 ‡ m ,31
we have  1 ‡
E
b V  and  1 ‡
E








bb H H H








b E r V V , ˆ  are decreasing functions in 
E
b V  and 
E
r V .
But then  ( ) ( )





b E E b b b b = £ = V V  and  ( ) ( )




b E E r r r r = £ = V V  is always true.
By a similar proof, it can be shown that 
* * *
I I b b ‡  and 
* * *
I I r r ‡ . Together this implies
* * *
I I B B ‡  and 
* * *
E E B B £ . This proves the relevant inequalities in parts (i)-(iii).
Note that the budget lines in  ( ) b r,  space (see figure 2a) have the slope –1. As indifference
curves are strictly convex, it follows for  I E D D ‡  that 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 1
, , ˆ , , ˆ


















I D ˆ , the condition can be equally ex-
pressed as  I I D D ˆ ‡ .  Similarly, 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 1
, , ˆ , , ˆ












b b  or equivalently
I E D D ˆ £  are sufficient for  E I B B > .
Consider now  0 £ a , where  0 2 = m . It then follows from (9c)-(9f) that (10b) can be rewritten
to  ( )( ) I I I E b I D D D H D ˆ ˆ , ˆ * * * + - ￿ = b .  Hence, 
* * * * * * * ˆ ˆ 0 E I I I I I B B D D D D < ￿ ‡ ￿ ‡ ￿ £ a .
This proves part ( i). Similarly, for  [ [ a a a ˆ , ˛  and thus  0 2 = m , we obtain
( )( ) I I E E b E D D D H D ˆ ˆ , ˆ * * * + - ￿ = b .  Here, 
* * * * * * * ˆ ˆ
I E I E I E B B D D D D < ￿ £ ￿ £ ￿ ‡a a .
This proves part (ii). Finally, for  a a ˆ ‡  a pooling allocation obtains where
P I E P I E B B B D D D = = ￿ = =
* * * * * * * * , which proves part (iii).n
Proof of Lemma 5:  In what follows we write the equilibrium degree of delegation
( ) I E i a d D
i
i , , ,
* * = = a  and the shadow prices  ( ) a , ˆ 1 a m m =  and  ( ) a , ˆ ˆ 2 a m m =  as functions of
the parameters a and a. From (9a), we obtain  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } 0 , , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 max 3 a a a a m a m l m - - - = .
(i) Consider  a a ˆ < . This implies  ( ) ( ) a d a d
E I , , a a < . Here,  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , a a
E I d d <  was
shown in Lemma 3, part (iii). We can now prove  ( ) ( ) a d a d
E I , , a a <  by contradiction. Sup-
pose  ( ) ( ) a d a d
E I , , a a > . As we see below, two cases can arise for  0 > a . First, the principal
sets  0 = I t . Here, the incentive problem is identical to the case  0 = a , implying that
( ) ( ) 0 , , a a
i i d a d =  and, thus, a contradiction. Second,  0 > I t . As the transfer is costly, it is
used in addition to the instruments  { } i i D B ,  only if this relaxes the incentive constraint (ICI).
This implies  ( ) ( )
* * 0 , , i
i
i
i D d D a d - £ - a a . Since  ( ) ( )
* * 0 , 0 , E
E I
I D d d D < < < a a , it must
then be true that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a d d d a d
E E I I , 0 , 0 , , a a a a < < < , again a contradiction.
We can now show that there exists a function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 a a  such that  ( ) a m a a £ ￿ >0 3 .
Since  ( ) ( ) a d a d
E I , , a a < , this implies  0 2 = m  and  ( ) ( ) { } 0 , , ˆ 1 max 3 a a a m l m - - = .  For
0 3 > m  comparative static analysis of the system  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = - I E E I I I r b U r b U b b , (9a) and
(9c)-(9f) with  0 2 = m  yields  ( ) 0 , ˆ = a a a m .  Hence,  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 , ˆ 0
, ˆ 1
3 < - = >
- - a da
a a d a m m
a m l . Since
0 ˆ 0 3 = ￿ > a m m , it follows that  ( ) ( ) ( ) a m a m a m m ˆ 0 , ˆ , ˆ 0 3 = = ￿ > a . Furthermore,
( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ a m  is positive and finite. But then  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 1 ˆ 1 lim
0 > - = - -
ﬁ l a m l a
a  and32
( ) ( ) [ ] -¥ = - -
¥ ﬁ a m l ˆ 1 lim a
a . Hence, there exists a function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 a a  such that
( ) ( ) ( ) a a m l m a a a £ ￿ > - - = 0 ˆ 1 3 .
(ii) Consider  a a ˆ ‡ . For this case we can show that on the domain  [ ) ¥ , ˆ a  there exists (a) a
unique function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 a a  such that  ( ) a m a a £ ￿ >0 3 ; (b) a unique correspondence
( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ a a  such that  ( ) ( ) a a m m a a a ˆ 0 , ˆ ˆ 2 £ ￿ > = ; and (c) a unique function  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ ˆ a a
such that  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a a a d a d
E I ˆ ˆ , , £ ￿ ‡ ; where
(iii)  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ £ £  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a a a a = = = .
For convenience, we prove part (iii) first, assuming the existence of  ( ) a a ,  ( ) a a ˆ  and  ( ) a a ˆ ˆ .
Consider  a a ˆ > . By way of contradiction suppose  ( ) ( ) a a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ <  and consider  ( ) ( ) ] [ a a a a a ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˛ .
Here,  ( ) 0 ˆ 2 > ￿ < m a a a  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) a d a d a a
E I , , ˆ ˆ a a a < ￿ > . We have shown in part (iii) of
Lemma 1 that this is a contradiction. Hence,  ( ) ( ) a a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ >  must be true. Next, by way of con-
tradiction suppose  ( ) ( ) a a a a < ˆ  and consider  ( ) ( ) ] [ a a a a a , ˆ ˛ . Here,  ( ) 0 ˆ 2 = ￿ > m a a a ,
whereas  ( ) 0 0 3 = ￿ > ￿ < I t a a m a . This implies  ( ) ( ) 0 , , a a
i i d a d = . But then, from
Lemma 3, part (iv) we know that  a a ˆ >  implies  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a d d d a d
I I E E , 0 , 0 , , a a a a = = = .
We have shown as corollary to the proof of Lemma 3 that  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , a a
E I d d =  and  a a ˆ >  im-
ply  0 2 > m . Hence, a contradiction and  ( ) ( ) a a a a > ˆ  must be true.
Now consider  a a ˆ = . Suppose  ( ) 0 0 3 = ￿ > ￿ < I t a a m a  and therefore
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a d d d a d
I I E E , 0 , 0 , , a a a a = = = . We have shown as corollary to Lemma 3 that
( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , a a
E I d d =  and  a a ˆ =  imply  0 2 = m . By definition,  ( ) 0 0 3 > ￿ = ￿ > I t a a m a . As
we have argued before, given  0 2 = m , the use of financial transfers implies a relaxation of
(ICI) and therefore,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a d d d a d
E E I I , ˆ 0 , ˆ 0 , ˆ , ˆ a a a a < = <  which is still consistent with
0 2 = m . But then, it follows that  ( ) ( ) a a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a a = . Since  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a a a £ £  must also be true, it
follows that  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a a a = = . Finally,
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) { } a a a a a a a , ˆ 1 lim , ˆ ˆ 1 , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 lim
ˆ ˆ a m l a m l a m a m l
a a a a
- - = - - = - - -
- + ﬁ ﬁ
 implies
( ) ( ) a a ˆ ˆ a a = .
To prove part (ii) (c) reconsider  a a ˆ > . For  ¥ ﬁ a , separation can be implemented at the
first-best values  { }
* * * * , , , I I E E r b r b  for an infinitesimally small value of  I t . This implies
( ) ( ) ¥ > ¥ , , a a
I E d d . Furthermore, comparative  statics for the system
( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = + - I I E E I I I at r b U r b U b b , (9a) and (9c)-(9f), where  0 2 = m , yield after tedious
calculations  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
, , > -




a I E d d
a a . Together with the fact that  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , a a
I E d d =  for
a a ˆ > , this implies the existence of a unique  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ ˆ a a  such that
( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a a a d a d
E I ˆ ˆ , , £ ￿ ‡ .33
To prove part (ii) (b), observe that  ( ) 0 , ˆ ˆ = ¥ a m . Furthermore, we have shown as part of the
proof of Lemma 3, part (iv) that  ( ) 0 0 , ˆ ˆ ˆ > ￿ > a m a a . Finally, comparative static analysis for
the system  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = + - I I E E I I I at r b U r b U b b ,  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = - - I E I I E E E at r b U r b U b b , (9a)
and (9c)-(9f) yields after tedious calculations  ( ) 0 , ˆ ˆ 0 2 < = m a m a a . It follows that there exists a
unique  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 ˆ a a  such that  ( ) ( ) a a m m a a a ˆ 0 , ˆ ˆ 2 £ ￿ > = .
To prove part (ii) (a), consider  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } 0 , , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 max 3 a a a a m a m l m - - - = . Comparative static
analysis for the full pooling system  ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = - I E E I I I r b U r b U b b ,
( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = - E I I E E E r b U r b U b b , (9a) and (9c)-(9f) with  0 2 > m  yields
( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ ˆ , ˆ = = a a a a a m a m .  Hence,  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 0
, ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1
2 3 < - - = > >
- - - a a da
a a a d a m a m m m
a m a m l . Since
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 3 = = ￿ > a a m m m , we have  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a m a m a m a m a m a m m ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 , ˆ ˆ 0 , ˆ , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 0 3 - = - = - ￿ > a a .
Furthermore,  ( ) ( ) ] [ ¥ ˛ - , 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ a m a m . But then  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) 0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 lim
0 > - = - - -
ﬁ l a m a m l a
a  and
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } -¥ = - - -
¥ ﬁ a m a m l ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 lim a
a . Hence, there exists a value  ( ) ( ) ¥ ˛ , 0 a a  such that
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) a a m a m l m a a a £ ￿ > - - - = 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 3 .n
Proof of Corollary L5:
(i) 0
* * = I t   in areas I and V follows from definition of  ( ) a a  and  ( ) a a  and
0 0 3 = ￿ > I t m .
(ii)
* * * *
I E D D >  in areas I and II follows from 
* * * * ˆ I E D D > ￿ <a a  as shown for part (i) of
Lemma 5 together with the definition of  ( ) a a ˆ ˆ  implying  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a a a a d a d
E I ˆ ˆ , , > ￿ < .
* * * *
I E D D =   in area V follows from the fact that  0
* * = I t  and  a a ˆ ‡  imply full pooling.
* * * *
I E D D <  in areas III and IV follows as a residual.n
Proof of Proposition 4: For the moment, we conjecture that both moral hazard constraints
(MHE) and (MHI) are binding and verify this later on (see part  i). Inserting
( ) ( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i a i r b e U r b e U t b b , , , , , ,
* 1 - = ,  I E i , =  into (2) and maximising with respect to
{ } I E i r b e i i i , , , , =  provides the first-order conditions
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) { } 0 , , , , , , , , 1 1 = - + = - i i i i i i a i i i i e a i i i e r b h r b u a r b e U r b h b b b (A6a);
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , , , , , ˆ , , , , , , , ,
* * 1 - - + - i i i i x i i i x i i i i e i i i i x a i i i x i r b e U r b e r b e U r b e U r b h e b b b b b
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
r b x I E i
r b h r b u
r b h r b u
e e r b h e
i i i i i x
i i i x i i















where  ( ) 0 , , ,
* = i i i i e r b e U b ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i e e h u r b e U - ￿ ￿ = b , , ,  and
( ) () () () () [ ] r b x h u h u e r b e U x x i i i i i x , ; , , , = ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ = b . The following can now be derived.34
(i)  Using (A6a) and (3) we can rewrite
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
* * , , , , , i i i i i i i i i i i e e r b ah r b h r b u a e > + = + = b b . Inserting  i e  and 
*
i e  into the moral haz-
ard constraints (MHi) and cancelling terms yields  ( ) 0 , ,
2
2 > = i i i
a
i r b h t b .



















b . Hence, 
+ + ‡ I E b b , 
+ + ‡ I E r r , implying
( ) ( )








2 , , , , b b , and 
+ + ‡ I E e e .
(iii)  Using (3) we can rewrite
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r b x r b e r b h r b u r b h r b u i i i x i i i i i x i i i x i i , ; , , ˆ , , , , , , = = + b b b . Substituting this and
( )
* , , i i i i i e r b ah e + = b  into (A6b) allows us to rewrite the first-order conditions to
() ( ) r b x I E i e h h e x x i , ; , ; 0 1 ˆ = = = - ￿ + ￿ . Inserting into this  ( ) [ ] ( ) i i i i i i r b h r b u a e b , , , + = ,
() ()
1 - ￿ = ￿ i i b b h h b ,  () ()
1 - ￿ = ￿ i r r h h r ,  ( ) ( ) () ()
1 ˆ
- ￿ ￿ + = ￿ i i b b h u e a b  and  () ( ) ( ) ()
1 ˆ
- ￿ ￿ - = ￿ i r r h u e a r  and
solving for  i b  and  i r , respectively, gives  ( ) () [ ] ()
2 2 ￿ ￿ + + =
+ h u a b i i i a b b  and
( ) () [ ] ()
2 2 ￿ ￿ - + =
+ h u a ri a r r . Hence, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ￿ - +









i D a r r
a b b
2
2 . It is then readily verified that
0 2
2 * < ￿ = > -
+ + a a r
a bi
i i D D .n
Proof of Proposition 5:
(i)  Follows directly from setting  0 1 1 = =
I E m m  in (16c) and (16d).
Using (16a) and (16b), where  0 1 1 = =
I E m m , we can rewrite (16e/f) and (16g/h) as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
( ) ( )
0
, , , , , ,








- - + -
E I I EI x
E
I I I II x
I
I I I II x I I I II x a I I I x II
r b e U r b e U
r b e U r b e U r b h e
b m b m
b b b l
;  r b x , = (16e’/f’),
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
( ) ( )
0
, , , , , ,

















I E E IE x
I
E E E EE x
E
E E E EE x E E E EE x a E E E x EE
r b e U r b e U
r b e U r b e U r b h e
b m b m
b b b l
;  r b x , = (16g’/h’).
It can then be shown that the optimum entails (a)  0 2 2 ‡ >
E I m m ; (b)  0 2 =
E m  if  I E D D >  or if
I E D D =  and  I E B B „ .
(a) Working with (16e’/f’) and (16g’/h’), the proof is analogous to the proof of part (i) of
Lemma 1.
(b) We prove this by contradiction. Thus, suppose  0 2 >
E m  when  I E D D > . Recall that
( ) ( ) E E E EE E I I EI
E D B e U D B e U b b m , , , , , , 0
* *
2 ‡ ￿ > . Using figure 2a), where E corresponds to
the allocation  { } E E D B , , we note that this implies an allocation  { } I I D B , '  on the  I D -ray to the
north-east of its intersection with the 
E U ˆ  indifference curve.  But then35
( ) ( )
I
E E E IE I I I II U D B e U D B e U ˆ , , , , , ' ,
* * = > b b . This contradicts  0 2 2 ‡ >
E I m m . By a similar
argument, it can be shown that  0 2 >
E m  contradicts  I E D D =  unless  I E B B = .
From (16e’/f’) and (16g’/h’), respectively, one obtains after tedious calculations
( )( ) ( )( ) E I
E I I r
E
I I
I I I r
I





















( )( ) ( )( )
+ + + + + - + - + = E E
E E E r
E
I E
I E E r
I




D D ˆ , , ˆ









i D  defined by (14). Note that (A7a) and (A7b) are similar to (10a) and (10b).
(ii)  From the first-order conditions in (16a) and (16b), where  0 1 1 = =
I E m m , we obtain





I m m l - = -  and  { } 0 , max 2 3
E
a




















l m  and  ( ) 0






l m . Observing that 
i
2 m ,  I E i , =  take on
finite non-negative values for  0 = a , it follows in analogy to the proof of Lemma 5 part I that
there exists  ( ) ( ) I E i ai , ; , 0 = ¥ ˛
+ a  such that  0 3 >
i m  if and only if  ( ) [ ] a
+ ˛ i a a , 0 . The trans-
fers are then given by  ( ) ( ) [ ] i i i ii i i i ii a i D B e U D B e U t b b , , , , , ,
* 1 - =
+ + ,  I E i , =  as indicated in
the Proposition.
(iii)  If  ( ) a
+ < i a a ,  I E i , = , then  ( ) ( ) i i i ii i i i i ii r b e U at r b e U b b , , , , , ,
* = + . The adverse selec-
tion constraints are then given by  ( ) ( ) I E E IE I I I II r b e U r b e U b b , , , , , ,
* * ‡  and
( ) ( ) E I I EI E E E EE r b e U r b e U b b , , , , , ,
* * ‡ . This is equivalent to the case  0 = i t ,  I E i , =  in the set-
ting without contractible output. In analogy to Lemma 5 together with figure 3 it is then easy
to establish a pooling equilibrium (area V). Using an argument similar to the one used in the
proof of parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3, we find from (A7a) and (A7b)
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
, , ˆ , , ˆ
2 = - + + ￿ = -
+ + + +
I E
r b U r b U E
I E D D Z D D






( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( )













I I I I I r I I I I I I r II
I E E E E r E E E E E E r EE
D D r b e r b h r b h e
D D r b e r b h r b h e
Z
ˆ , , ˆ , , , ,





Hence, for  0 2 ‡
E m ,  0 ˆ £ ￿ =
+ + + + Z D D I E . Assuming pooling, i.e.  P I E b b b = =
+ + + +  and
P I E r r r = =
+ + + +  one finds from (A8) that
{ } ( ) ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ 0 ˆ 2 2
; £ - - - ￿ £
+ +
= = = = + + + + + + + + I I P I E P r r r b b b D D b D D b Z
I E
P I E P I E
b b . Inserting from (6) and
(14) while observing 
+ + + + = I E D D  one finds36
{ }
( ) ( ) [ ]















+ - - + - +
+ - + -
￿ £
= = = =
+ + + + + + + +
I E
I E
P I E P I E
P I P I E P
P I P E





b r b b r a a
b r b r a
,
where a ˆ  as defined in (12). As the first term in bracelets is unambiguously negative, it fol-
lows that  { } 0 ˆ ˆ
; < ￿ ‡
= = = = + + + + + + + +
P I E P I E r r r b b b Z a a . But then  a a ˆ ‡  and  ( ) a
+ < i a a  are sufficient
for pooling. Further boundaries corresponding to those in figure 3 can be derived.n
Proof of Lemma 8: From (15a) and (15b), we find that case 1 applies if and only if
( ) ( ) E I E E IE I E E IE at r b e U r b e U + > b b , , , , , ,
*  and  ( ) ( ) I E I I EI E E E EE at r b e U r b e U + > b b , , , , , ,
* .
Inserting  ( ) ( ) [ ] E E E EE E E E EE a E r b e U r b e U t b b , , , , , ,
* 1 - =  and
( ) ( ) [ ] I I I II I E E IE a I r b e U r b e U t b b , , , , , ,
* 1 - = , these conditions can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * , , , , , , , , , , , , IE EE I E E IE E E E EE I E E IE E E E EE e e r b e U r b e U r b e U r b e U > ￿ - > - b b b b (113a);
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I I I II E I I EI I E E IE E E E EE r b e U r b e U r b e U r b e U b b b b , , , , , , , , , , , ,
* * + > -
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) v
b b
b b b 2 *
, , , ,
, , , , , , , 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
IE r b h r b h
r b h r b h r b h r b u
II e e
I I I E I I
I E E E E E E I I E E = < ￿
-
- ,
where  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 :
, , , , , ,






I I I II E I I EI
I E E IE E E E EE
r b e U r b e U
r b e U r b e U
b b
b b v  follows from the  monotonicity condition. It is readily
verified that the RHS inequality in (113a) is always true, leaving the condition as stated in the
Lemma.n
Proof of Lemma 9: From (15a)  0 1 =
I m  if and only if
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I I I II E I I EI I E E IE E E E EE r b e U r b e U r b e U r b e U b b b b , , , , , , , , , , , , - > -
( )
( ) [ ] { } ( )
( ) [ ] { }
2 2
, ,
, , 2 2
, ,
, , 1 1 II r b h
r b h
EE r b h








b - > - ￿ .n
Proof of Proposition 6:
(i)  Follows immediately from (16c) and (16d), where  0 1 1 = >
I E m m . Noting that
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] { } 0 1 , , , , , ,
2
, ,





II I I I II e E I I EI e e r b e U r b e U b




(ii)  Follows immediately from  0 1 >
E m  and  0 2 >
I m . The latter is true since (16e) implies
+ + + + < I I b b . But  0 2 >
I m  follows in analogy to the proof of part (i) of Lemma 1.
(iii)  Follows immediately from (16g/h), where  0 1 =
I m .
(iv)  Follows from (16e/f), where  0 1 >
E m . Here,
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 0 , , , , , , 3 , ,





II I I I II b E I I EI b e r b e U r b e U
b
b b b , where37
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 , , , , , , , , :
2 1 < - = - = L
- + r b b b b b b b b I I E I I I I E I I b E I I I I I b r b r b h r b h r b h r b h
E I  and
( ) ( ) 0 , , , , , , = - I I I II r E I I EI r r b e U r b e U b b . Hence, it follows from (16e/f) that 
+ + +
I b  is distorted
downwards, that 
+ + +
I r  remains undistorted, and, by implication, that 
+ + +
I B  and 
+ + +
I D  are dis-
torted downwards.n
Proof of Proposition 7: In analogy to the analysis set out in section 4 the degree of delega-
tion under asymmetric information can be determined as
( )( )




L L D D D D D D
H L L r L L L r ˆ ˆ * , , ˆ *
1






* , , ˆ *
1





H H D D D D D D







i D a r
a b
-
+ = ˆ  and 
i
i




2 * ,  L H i , = ; where  0 2 1 ‡ > m m  and  0 2
* * * * = ￿ > m L H D D . Us-
ing the above expressions, the following is readily established.
(i) 0 ˆ * * * * > ￿ > ￿ > L L L L L D D D D a ;
(ii) L H L H H H D D D D a a 2 ˆ * * * * < ￿ < ￿ <
(iii) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
* * * * £ - + - = ￿ = =
H L H
P P L P L H L P L H D D D X D D D
a a a a a a a .
Noting that  ( ) 0 2
1 > H X a  and  ( ) 0 = H X a , the above inequality is true for a  range
[ ] H L a a a , ˛ , with  ( ] H H a a a , 2
1 ˛ , if  ( ) ( ) 0 ln 1 ' lim










a a a . Ob-





a , it follows that  ( ) 0 ln 1 ' lim
* > + - =
ﬁ




 is sufficient, thus, implying
the condition provided in the Lemma.n